{"id":264,"date":"2002-08-26T10:48:48","date_gmt":"2002-08-26T08:48:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/?p=264"},"modified":"2020-07-10T10:51:52","modified_gmt":"2020-07-10T08:51:52","slug":"silahlarin-kuresellesmesi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/?p=264","title":{"rendered":"S\u0130LAHLARIN K\u00dcRESELLE\u015eMES\u0130"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Yavuz Alogan<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sava\u015flar bir kez ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda kendi kurallar\u0131n\u0131 dayatarak geli\u015firler ve her evrede beklenmedik durumlar yaratarak \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemeyen sonu\u00e7lara yol a\u00e7arlar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Birinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan hemen \u00f6nce sava\u015f ekonomisine ve askeri teknolojiye ili\u015fkin \u00e7e\u015fitli teoriler geli\u015ftirildi. Bunlardan ikisi \u00f6zellikle an\u0131lmaya de\u011fer. Birine g\u00f6re, silahlar\u0131n y\u0131k\u0131m g\u00fcc\u00fc artt\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in sava\u015f k\u0131sa s\u00fcrecek ve taraflardan birinin silah teknolojisini etkin bi\u00e7imde kullanmas\u0131yla di\u011ferinin sava\u015ftan \u00e7ekilmesi h\u0131zl\u0131 bir bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lacakt\u0131. Di\u011ferine g\u00f6re, uzun s\u00fcreli sava\u015f ve kesin bir zafer imkans\u0131zd\u0131, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc galip gelen taraf\u0131n iktisaden \u00e7\u00f6kmesine yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131. D\u00f6nemin b\u00fct\u00fcn askeri d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcrleri sava\u015fta \u00e7ok az can kayb\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131yordu. Oysa be\u015f y\u0131l s\u00fcren sava\u015f boyunca g\u00fcnde ortalama 6000 ki\u015fi \u00f6lecek, d\u00f6nemin \u00fcst\u00fcn silah teknolojisi kolay bir zafere de\u011fil b\u00fct\u00fcn cephelerde kilitlenmeye yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131.<a href=\"#_edn1\">[i]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Benzer bir durum \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 \u00f6ncesinde de g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc. Almanlar, General Heinz Guderian\u2019\u0131n geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi, uzun menzilli tank harek\u00e2t\u0131na dayanan <em>blitzkrieg<\/em> (y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m sava\u015f\u0131) y\u00f6ntemiyle k\u0131sa s\u00fcrede b\u00fct\u00fcn K\u0131ta Avrupas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 dize getireceklerine ve \u0130ngiltere ile ABD\u2019yi sava\u015f\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda tutacaklar\u0131na inan\u0131yorlard\u0131. Orta ve Bat\u0131 Avrupa\u2019da ba\u015far\u0131ya ula\u015fan bu y\u00f6ntem, G\u00fcney Avrupa\u2019da etkisiz kald\u0131 ve Guderian\u2019\u0131n panzer birlikleri Stalingrad \u00f6nlerinde kendisinden \u00e7ok daha zay\u0131f ve da\u011f\u0131n\u0131k g\u00fc\u00e7ler kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda bozguna u\u011frad\u0131.<a href=\"#_edn2\">[ii]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>M\u00fcttefiklerin <em>blietzkrieg<\/em>\u2019e yan\u0131t\u0131, \u201cstratejik hava bombard\u0131man\u0131\u201d idi. Bu y\u00f6ntem Alman i\u015fgalindeki kentlere ve Alman sanayi b\u00f6lgelerine uygulanacak ve d\u00fc\u015fman\u0131n teslim olmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131. Ancak daha sonra yap\u0131lan ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar, \u201cstratejik hava bombard\u0131man\u0131\u201dn\u0131n a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki insanlar \u00fczerinde \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 etki yaratmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ortaya koydu. <a href=\"#_edn3\">[iii]<\/a> Bu y\u00f6ntem, sivil halk\u0131n dayan\u0131\u015fma duygusunu artt\u0131r\u0131yor, askerleri de u\u011frad\u0131klar\u0131 kay\u0131plar\u0131 telafi etmek i\u00e7in yarat\u0131c\u0131 y\u00f6ntemlere zorluyordu. Almanlar\u2019\u0131n Londra\u2019ya \u00f6nce Zeplinlerle daha sonra hafif bombard\u0131man u\u00e7aklar\u0131yla yapt\u0131klar\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n da asker ve sivil \u0130ngilizler \u00fczerinde benzer etkiler yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ispatland\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Almanlar sava\u015f\u0131n ikinci yar\u0131s\u0131nda <em>blietzkrieg<\/em> taktiklerini b\u0131rakarak tahkimat d\u00fczenlerine ge\u00e7erlerken, \u201cstratejik hava bombard\u0131man\u0131\u201dndan sonu\u00e7 alamayan M\u00fcttefikler de amfibik \u00e7\u0131karma ve piyade sava\u015f\u0131 kabiliyetlerini geli\u015ftirmeye ba\u015flad\u0131lar. Her iki sava\u015fta da sava\u015f \u00f6ncesinde askeri harek\u00e2t baz\u0131nda geli\u015ftirilen strateji ve taktiklerin \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemeyen nedenlerle ge\u00e7ersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131na tan\u0131k olundu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>YUGOSLAVYA VE AFGAN\u0130STAN<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO\u2019nun Yugoslav devletini par\u00e7alama seferi s\u0131ras\u0131nda da askeri \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcler ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmedi. Asker kay\u0131plar\u0131 konusunda \u00e7ok hassas olan Amerikal\u0131lar, yo\u011fun bir hava bombard\u0131man\u0131yla S\u0131rp kuvvetlerini tamamen yok edeceklerini ve Milosevi\u00e7 iktidar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6kerteceklerini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015flerdi. Hava ak\u0131nlar\u0131 Kosova\u2019da k\u00f6pr\u00fcleri y\u0131kt\u0131, bo\u015falt\u0131lm\u0131\u015f k\u0131\u015fla binalar\u0131n\u0131 yerle bir etti; ordunun \u00e7oktan \u0131skartaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 kamyonlar\u0131 havaya u\u00e7urdu, a\u00e7\u0131k araziye yerle\u015ftirilmi\u015f ve hepsi tahtadan yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f y\u00fczlerce helikopter, tank ve top maketini tahrip etti. Bu arada sabit askeri ileti\u015fim hatlar\u0131 kesildi, ancak mobil telsizlere kar\u015f\u0131 15 000 feet y\u00fckseklikten yap\u0131labilecek bir \u015fey yoktu. NATO u\u00e7aklar\u0131, fabrikalar\u0131, Belgrad\u2019da bir \u00e7ocuk tiyatrosu binas\u0131n\u0131, \u00c7in konsoloslu\u011funu vurdular; bir M\u00fclteci kamp\u0131na ve \u00e7e\u015fitli m\u00fclteci konvoylar\u0131na ate\u015f a\u00e7t\u0131lar. B\u00fct\u00fcn bunlara ra\u011fmen, Milosevi\u00e7\u2019in yerinden edilmesi ve iktidar de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi, \u00e7ok sonra, Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 NGO\u2019lar\u0131n faaliyetiyle ve d\u0131\u015fardan y\u00f6nlendirilen entrikalarla m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu. Bombard\u0131mandan hemen sonra Kosova\u2019ya giden Regis Debray, burada da hava ak\u0131nlar\u0131n\u0131n halk\u0131n dayan\u0131\u015fma duygular\u0131n\u0131 artt\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, insanlar\u0131n \u201cher iki taraf\u0131n da \u00f6l\u00fc verdi\u011fi ger\u00e7ek bir sava\u015f\u0131\u201d tercih ettiklerini ve \u00f6fke i\u00e7inde olduklar\u0131n\u0131 saptad\u0131. <a href=\"#_edn4\">[iv]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;B\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnyaya seyirlik olarak izletilen Ba\u011fdat bombard\u0131man\u0131n\u0131n r\u00f6van\u015f\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturan 11 Eyl\u00fcl New York sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen Afganistan bombard\u0131man\u0131 da kesin bir sonu\u00e7 vermedi, tam aksine, ABD ve Avrupa halklar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck korkular, paranoid reflesksler yaratan tehlikeli bir belirsizli\u011fe ve sald\u0131r\u0131ya u\u011frayan b\u00f6lgelerde bir i\u00e7 sava\u015f potansiyeline yol a\u00e7t\u0131. El Kaide militanlar\u0131, \u00f6zellikle Tora Bora\u2019da k\u0131smi kay\u0131plara u\u011framalar\u0131na, esir vermelerine ra\u011fmen, \u00f6nder kadrolar\u0131n\u0131 korudular ve silahl\u0131 olarak b\u00fct\u00fcn Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesine yay\u0131ld\u0131lar. Afganistan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7inde bile tam bir h\u00e2kimiyet sa\u011flanamad\u0131. Amerikan petrol \u015firketlerinin adam\u0131 olan Karzai\u2019yi ayakta tutmak i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderilen uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 sadece Kabil ve c\u0131var\u0131nda g\u00fcvenli\u011fi sa\u011flayabildi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD\u2019nin Afganistan\u2019da i\u00e7ine d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u00e7\u0131kmaz 22 Ocak 2002 tarihli STRATFOR stratejik analizinde a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ortaya konulmu\u015f, Afganistan\u2019da h\u0131zla geli\u015fmekte olan \u201cfactionalism\u201d ve \u201cwarlordism\u201din (hiziple\u015fme ve sava\u015f a\u011fal\u0131\u011f\u0131) parasal yard\u0131m ve askeri g\u00fc\u00e7le \u00f6nlenemeyecek boyutlarda oldu\u011fu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ifade edilmi\u015ftir. \u015eimdiki halde, Bat\u0131l\u0131 askerlerin incinmemesi i\u00e7in, PKK\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 tecr\u00fcbe kazanm\u0131\u015f T\u00fcrk askerlerinin Afgan da\u011flar\u0131ndaki gerillalarla sava\u015fmas\u0131 beklenmekte, T\u00fcrk Genel Kurmay\u0131 da buna direnmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Emperyalizmin paras\u0131 da bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm olamamaktad\u0131r. Ayn\u0131 raporda, \u015fu sat\u0131rlar\u0131 okuyoruz: \u201cKarzai\u2019nin ge\u00e7ici h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin elindeki tek ara\u00e7, para da\u011f\u0131tma kabiliyetidir. Ancak Karzai zor bir konumdad\u0131r. Bol miktarda para da\u011f\u0131tmas\u0131 halinde sava\u015f a\u011falar\u0131n\u0131n ona ihtiyac\u0131 kalmayacakt\u0131r. Eli s\u0131k\u0131 davranmas\u0131 halinde ise sava\u015f a\u011falar\u0131n\u0131n itaatini sa\u011flayamayacakt\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece Karzai gittik\u00e7e belirsizle\u015fen bir durumla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kalmaktad\u0131r.\u201d <a href=\"#_edn5\">[v]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Afganistan\u2019da halen \u00e7ok tarafl\u0131 bir gerilla sava\u015f\u0131 s\u00fcrmekte, Afgan k\u00f6yl\u00fc \u00e7ocuklar\u0131na beyzbol \u00f6\u011freten Amerikan askerlerinin CNN ekranlar\u0131na yans\u0131yan g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerine ra\u011fmen, d\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn t\u00f6renlerini ve k\u00f6yleri g\u00f6r\u00fcnmez u\u00e7aklarla bombalanan halk\u0131n hem ABD ve Karzai\u2019ye hem de orada bulunan yabanc\u0131 askerlere kar\u015f\u0131 duyduklar\u0131 \u00f6fke gittik\u00e7e artmakta, \u00fczerinde Usame bin Laden resmi olan fanilalar\u0131 im\u00e2l eden esnaf b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u00f6lgede patlama yapan talebi kar\u015f\u0131lamakta zorluk \u00e7ekmektedir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Y\u00dcKSEK S\u0130LAH TEKNOLOJ\u0130S\u0130N\u0130N ETK\u0130S\u0130<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD b\u00fct\u00fcn bu sava\u015flarda, Ortado\u011fu, Kafkaslar ve Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019dan ba\u015flayarak, Basra K\u00f6rfezi, Akdeniz ve Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n i\u00e7lerine do\u011fru geli\u015fecek muhtemel bir konvansiyonel Sovyet sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131, bat\u0131 kapitalizminin sinir merkezlerinden uzakta ve cepheden kar\u015f\u0131lamak i\u00e7in 1950\u2019li y\u0131llardan itibaren s\u00fcrekli bir teknolojik yenilemeyle geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi silah, f\u00fcze ve radar sistemlerini kulland\u0131. Ancak kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc hava savunma deste\u011fine sahip Sovyet z\u0131rhl\u0131 birlikleri de\u011fil, u\u00e7aklar\u0131 havalanamayan, yedek par\u00e7as\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in tanklar\u0131 bozulan, h\u00e2l\u00e2 \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan kalma u\u00e7aksavar topu kullanan, kara sava\u015f\u0131 beklentisi i\u00e7inde RPG ve Kale\u015fnikovlarla donat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f gayri nizami say\u0131labilecek kuvvetler vard\u0131. Bunun belki de tek istisnas\u0131, K\u00f6rfez Sava\u015f\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda Kuveyt\u2019ten \u00e7ekilmesine izin verilen ve Kuzey\u2019e do\u011fru hareket halindeyken havadan ve denizden vurulan Irak motorize birlikleridir. Burada 150 000 c\u0131var\u0131nda (farkl\u0131 kaynaklara g\u00f6re de\u011fi\u015fen bir say\u0131) Irakl\u0131 asker ne oldu\u011fu tam olarak bilinmeyen silah sistemleriyle vurularak \u00e7\u00f6le g\u00f6m\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Ancak K\u00f6rfez Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019nda da sava\u015flar\u0131n \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemezlik kural\u0131 i\u015flemi\u015f, kentlerin ve stratejik noktalar\u0131n yo\u011fun bombard\u0131man\u0131 ne Saddam\u2019\u0131n iktidar yap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6zebilmi\u015f ne de halk kitlelerinde h\u00fck\u00fcmete kar\u015f\u0131 isyana neden olacak bir moral y\u0131k\u0131m yaratabilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bu deneyimden sonra ABD\u2019nin d\u00fc\u015fman il\u00e2n etti\u011fi \u00fclkelerin onun kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131k arazide z\u0131rhl\u0131 ve\/ya da motorize birliklerle \u00e7\u0131kma ihtimali ortadan kalkm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD\u2019nin d\u00fc\u015fman il\u00e2n etti\u011fi \u00fclkeler, ba\u015fta Irak olmak \u00fczere, kendi silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerini kent ve k\u0131r gerillas\u0131 y\u00f6ntemleriyle uzun s\u00fcreli bir direni\u015fe haz\u0131rlamaktad\u0131rlar. Emperyalistlerin korkusu, \u00fcst\u00fcn silah tekolojisine ra\u011fmen b\u00fct\u00fcn cephelerde yenilgiye u\u011frad\u0131klar\u0131 1815-1960 d\u00f6neminin klasik s\u00f6m\u00fcrge sava\u015f\u0131 y\u00f6ntemlerine d\u00f6n\u00fclmesidir. Bu durumda Amerikal\u0131lar ve ortaklar\u0131 y\u00fcksek teknolojiyle y\u0131k\u0131ma u\u011fratt\u0131klar\u0131, orta\u00e7a\u011f d\u00fczeyine gerilettikleri b\u00f6lgelere girerek RPG ve Kale\u015fnikovlarla silahlanm\u0131\u015f d\u00fczensiz g\u00fc\u00e7lerle sava\u015fmak zorunda kalacaklard\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; \u00d6zetle, Yugoslavya, Irak ve Afganistan sava\u015flar\u0131, ABD\u2019nin ve NATO g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin, Sovyetler Birli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 geli\u015ftirilen silah, f\u00fcze ve radar sistemleriyle, Ortado\u011fu, Avrasya ve Uzak Asya b\u00f6lgelerinde siyasal sonu\u00e7 alma \u015fans\u0131n\u0131n bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ortaya koymu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bu durum Amerikal\u0131lara iki se\u00e7enek b\u0131rakmaktad\u0131r: Birincisi, stratejik noktalara indirilen k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck kara birliklerinin yo\u011fun hava deste\u011fiyle harek\u00e2t yapmalar\u0131. \u0130kincisi ise yar\u0131\u00e7ap etkisi s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 n\u00fckleer bombalar\u0131n kullan\u0131lmas\u0131. Nitekim k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck Bush bu y\u0131l\u0131n ilk bas\u0131n toplant\u0131s\u0131nda Irak\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 uygulanacak mevcut se\u00e7enekler aras\u0131nda n\u00fckleer silahlar\u0131n da bulundu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a belirtmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ancak hen\u00fcz denenmedi\u011fi i\u00e7in olduk\u00e7a riskli g\u00f6r\u00fclen birinci y\u00f6ntemin k\u0131ymetli Amerikan askerlerinin can kayb\u0131na, yeni sendromlara (Vietnam ve Afganistan sendromlar\u0131 gibi) yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131; ikincisinin ise gayri nizami g\u00fc\u00e7lerle sava\u015fta uygulanmas\u0131 gereken bir uluslararas\u0131 hukuk kural\u0131n\u0131, \u201ce\u015fit g\u00fc\u00e7lerle mukabele\u201d ilkesini a\u011f\u0131r bi\u00e7imde ihlal edece\u011fi ve d\u00fcnya kamuoyunu aya\u011fa kald\u0131raca\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. Bu nedenle ABD, Irak sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 zamana yayacak, bu arada Bat\u0131l\u0131 m\u00fcttefiklerini ikna \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecek ve en \u00f6nemlisi \u00e7e\u015fitli provokasyonlar d\u00fczenleyerek b\u00f6lge devletlerini birbirine d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmeye; s\u00f6z gelimi, Suudi Arabistan\u2019a d\u00fc\u015fmanca davran\u0131rken Suriye ve L\u00fcbnan\u2019\u0131 \u0130srail\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 koruyormu\u015f gibi bir tutum almaya, \u0130ran\u2019la T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin aras\u0131n\u0131 bozmaya, Barzani\u2019yi T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rtmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facakt\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda ABD, sava\u015f\u0131n ate\u015fini, kay\u0131plar\u0131n\u0131 ve y\u00fck\u00fcn\u00fc b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerine payla\u015ft\u0131rmaya ve kayba u\u011framaks\u0131z\u0131n son s\u00f6z\u00fc s\u00f6yleyen bir d\u00fczenleyici rol\u00fc oynamaya ve en risksiz ko\u015fullarda belirleyici askeri m\u00fcdahalelerde bulunmaya haz\u0131rlanmaktad\u0131r. Peki Amerika b\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar\u0131 neden yapmaktad\u0131r?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>AMER\u0130KA NE \u0130ST\u0130YOR?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Britanya emperyalizminin uzun s\u00fcreli \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden ders alan ABD\u2019nin d\u00fcnya hegemonyas\u0131 i\u00e7in stratejik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler geli\u015ftirme \u00e7abas\u0131 \u00e7ok eskilere uzan\u0131r. 1900\u2019lerin ba\u015f\u0131nda Halford J. Mackinder, siyasal tarihin geli\u015fimini jeopolitik temelde yorumlayarak d\u00fcnya co\u011frafyas\u0131n\u0131 siyasal ve askeri strateji bak\u0131m\u0131ndan, mihver saha, i\u00e7 ve d\u0131\u015f ku\u015fak alanlar\u0131na ay\u0131rarak hegemonik hedefleri tan\u0131mlad\u0131. Buna g\u00f6re d\u00fcnya hegemonyas\u0131n\u0131n \u015fart\u0131 Avrasya h\u00e2kimiyetidir. Avrasya\u2019ya h\u00e2kim olmak i\u00e7in odak noktas\u0131n\u0131 Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n olu\u015fturdu\u011fu bir merkez alan (heartland) hakimiyeti gerekmekte, Anadolu Do\u011fu Avrupa sahas\u0131 i\u00e7inde kal\u0131rken, Ortado\u011fu, Avrasya topraklar\u0131n\u0131 kapsayan i\u00e7 ku\u015fa\u011f\u0131n merkezinde yer almaktad\u0131r. <a href=\"#_edn6\">[vi]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 ele\u015ftiren Nicholas John Spykman, 1940\u2019lar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda d\u00fcnya hegemonyas\u0131 kuracak g\u00fcc\u00fcn h\u00e2kim olmas\u0131 gereken hatt\u0131n, bat\u0131 Avrupa-T\u00fcrkiye-Irak-Pakistan-Afganistan-Hindistan-\u00c7in-Kore-Do\u011fu Sibirya oldu\u011funu \u00f6ne s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015f, b\u00f6ylece Sovyet topraklar\u0131n\u0131 ku\u015fatmay\u0131 ama\u00e7layan NATO-CENTO-SEATO gibi kurulu\u015flar\u0131n fikir babal\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<a href=\"#_edn7\">[vii]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin 1989-1991\u2019de \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ve Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n kapitalist sisteme ilhak\u0131yla birlikte, NATO\u2019nun, Polonya, Macaristan ve \u00c7ek Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni (Do\u011fu Avrupa merkez alan\u0131) kapsayarak geni\u015flemesini savunan, Yugoslavya\u2019n\u0131n par\u00e7alanmas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli rol oynayan, Amerikan \u015fahinlerinin babas\u0131 Zbigniew Brzezinski, ABD\u2019nin stratejik hegemonya tezlerini geli\u015ftirerek b\u00fcy\u00fck bir emperyalist sentez olu\u015fturmu\u015ftur. <em>Grand Chessboard<\/em>\/B\u00fcy\u00fck Satran\u00e7 Tahtas\u0131 ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 kitab\u0131nda Brzezinski, \u201cAvrasya\u2019ya h\u00e2kim olan d\u00fcnyaya h\u00e2kim olur,\u201d g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc tekrarlamakta, ABD\u2019nin acil g\u00f6revinin, \u201cAvrasya haritas\u0131na h\u00e2kim olan jeopolitik \u00e7o\u011fulculu\u011fu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek,\u201d oldu\u011funu belirterek, bu b\u00f6lgenin siyasal ve idari olarak par\u00e7alanmas\u0131n\u0131, yani tam bir b\u00f6l ve y\u00f6net siyasetini \u00f6nermektedir. Brzezinski\u2019ye g\u00f6re bu ba\u011flamda ABD\u2019nin \u00f6nlemesi gereken tehlike, \u201c\u00c7in, Rusya ve belki de \u0130ran b\u00fcy\u00fck koalisyonu,\u201d \u201c\u00c7in-Japon ekseni\u201d ve \u201cAlman- Rus ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ya da Frans\u0131z-Rus antant\u0131\u201dd\u0131r.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn8\">[viii]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ABD\u2019nin 11 Eyl\u00fcl sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan Afganistan ve \u00d6zbekistan\u2019da yeni askeri \u00fcsler kurmas\u0131; G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 \u00c7e\u00e7enleri desteklemeye ve Birle\u015fik Devletler Toplulu\u011fu\u2019ndan ayr\u0131lmaya zorlamas\u0131 ve bu \u00fclkeye T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi de kullanarak askeri yard\u0131mda bulunmas\u0131; Irak\u2019\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7e b\u00f6lmeye (K\u00fcrt, S\u00fcnni ve \u015eii) u\u011fra\u015fmas\u0131; \u0130ran h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ile Azeri n\u00fcfusun aras\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7maya, \u0130srail ile Azerbaycan aras\u0131nda stratejik ili\u015fki kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 vb. bu genel stratejinin par\u00e7alar\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ABD, Sovyet sisteminin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden sonra, \u201cdetant\u201d siyasetini s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fcr g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekle birlikte silahlanma harcamalar\u0131n\u0131 artt\u0131rd\u0131. ABD\u2019nin \u201csavunma\u201d harcamalar\u0131 d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck askeri b\u00fct\u00e7elerine sahip alt\u0131 \u00fclkenin -Rusya, Japonya, Fransa, Almanya, Britanya ve \u00c7in- askeri harcamalar\u0131n\u0131n toplam\u0131na yak\u0131nd\u0131r. B\u00f6ylelikle ABD\u2019nin d\u00fcnya askeri harcamalar\u0131 i\u00e7indeki pay\u0131, So\u011fuk Sava\u015f d\u00f6neminin zirvesini olu\u015fturan 1985 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki pay\u0131ndan daha b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fcr. Bu harcamalar ABD\u2019nin NATO d\u0131\u015f\u0131 m\u00fcttefiklerini de kapsamaktad\u0131r. S\u00f6z gelimi, ABD\u2019nin Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 askeri harcamalar, \u0130ran ve Irak\u2019\u0131n toplam savunma harcamalar\u0131n\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k d\u00f6rt kat\u0131, G\u00fcney Kore i\u00e7in yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 harcamalar Kuzey Kore\u2019nin yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 harcamalar\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k \u00fc\u00e7 kat\u0131d\u0131r.<a href=\"#_edn9\">[ix]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ABD\u2019nin s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bu askeri haz\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131n El Kaide\u2019ye (uluslararas\u0131 \u201cter\u00f6rizm\u201d) ya da Irak\u2019a (n\u00fckleer-kimyasal-biyolojik silah \u00fcretimi varsay\u0131m\u0131) y\u00f6nelik olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00e7ok a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. ABD, eski SSCB gibi bir iktisadi ve askeri g\u00fcc\u00fcn, d\u00fcnya hegemonyas\u0131na giden yolda \u00f6n\u00fcne \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemeye; potansiyel g\u00fc\u00e7lerin ittifak imk\u00e2nlar\u0131n\u0131 ortadan kald\u0131rmaya; bu g\u00fc\u00e7leri i\u00e7 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarla me\u015fgul ederek zay\u0131flatmaya ve i\u00e7inde yer ald\u0131klar\u0131 jeopolitik ortam\u0131 askeri olarak ku\u015fatmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Irak\u2019a y\u00f6nelik her tehdit Rusya\u2019y\u0131, Kuzey Kore\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik her tehdit ise dolayl\u0131 olarak \u00c7in\u2019i hedeflemektedir. Zira, ABD hegemonyas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 tek ba\u015flar\u0131na b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olu\u015fturan, birlikte ya da e\u015fzamanl\u0131 hareket ettikleri zaman daha da b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olu\u015fturabilecek iki \u00fclke Rusya ve \u00c7in\u2019dir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD\u2019nin, potansiyel has\u0131mlar\u0131 ve stratejik hedefleri olan bu iki \u00fclkeye yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 ikilidir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD\u2019nin Kafkasya ve Orta Asya\u2019daki faaliyetlerinin esas amac\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Hazar Denizi hidrokarbon kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n (ikmal yollar\u0131yla birlikte) do\u011frudan ya da dolayl\u0131 denetimini ele ge\u00e7irerek iktisadi stratejiyi askeri stratejiyle birle\u015ftirmesini ve b\u00f6ylece Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesine giri\u015fi sa\u011flayan kadim Rus emperyal b\u00f6lgelerine yeniden h\u00e2kim olmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemektir. Bu ama\u00e7la 1996\u2019dan itibaren Hazar Denizi \u00e7evresi ABD petrol \u015firketlerinin sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131na u\u011fram\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu \u015firketler, b\u00f6lge cumhuriyetlerinin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savunmu\u015flar, Rus denetiminin d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda petrol ihracat yollar\u0131 olu\u015fturmaya ve Rus ku\u015fatmas\u0131n\u0131 k\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Bu arada uluslararas\u0131 finans\u00f6r ve \u00fc\u00e7k\u00e2\u011f\u0131t\u00e7\u0131 George Soros, T\u00fcrkiye ve Macaristan\u2019daki faaliyetlerini Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesine de ta\u015f\u0131yarak, ileti\u015fim altyap\u0131s\u0131, e\u011fitim, kad\u0131n sorunu vb. gibi konularda kendi \u015firketlerine \u00e7e\u015fitli yat\u0131r\u0131mlar ve ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar yapt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD ayn\u0131 zamanda Romanya ve Bulgaristan\u2019\u0131n Bat\u0131 Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne giri\u015fini ate\u015fli bi\u00e7imde savunarak Karadeniz\u2019deki Rus etkisini k\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00d6te yanda, \u00f6zellikle Clinton h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00f6d\u00fcllerle Rusya\u2019y\u0131 yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131rmay\u0131 ve onunla bir ittifak g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fc yaratmay\u0131 da ihmal etmemi\u015ftir: G-7 ve Paris Kul\u00fcb\u00fc \u00fcyeli\u011fi, \u00e7e\u015fitli iktisadi tavizler, Avrupa G\u00fcvenlik ve \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Te\u015fkilat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi \u00e7abalar\u0131, NATO-Rusya ortakl\u0131k s\u00f6zle\u015fmesi vb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bu \u015fekilde yak\u0131n tutulmas\u0131 kimseyi yan\u0131ltmamal\u0131d\u0131r. Kafas\u0131na kur\u015fun s\u0131k\u0131lacak hasm\u0131 yak\u0131nda tutmak ve ona her t\u00fcrl\u00fc ikramda bulunmak Al Capone\u2019dan bu yana Amerikan mafyas\u0131n\u0131n geleneksel kural\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ayn\u0131 ikili yakla\u015f\u0131m \u00c7in\u2019e y\u00f6nelik ABD tutumlar\u0131nda da ge\u00e7erlidir. S\u00f6z gelimi, ABD bu \u00fclkenin 11 Aral\u0131k 2001\u2019de D\u00fcnya Ticaret \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc\u2019ne (WTO) girmesini desteklemi\u015f, \u00c7in pazar\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015fmesi i\u00e7in u\u011fra\u015fm\u0131\u015f (mal\u00fbm, Amerikal\u0131lar her zaman \u00c7in\u2019de piyasa ili\u015fkileri geli\u015ftik\u00e7e \u00c7KP iktidar\u0131n\u0131n zay\u0131flayaca\u011f\u0131 \u015feklinde tuhaf bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnceye sahip olmu\u015flard\u0131r!), Boeing u\u00e7aklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli aksamlar\u0131n\u0131n K\u0131z\u0131l Ordu\u2019nun askeri bir disiplinle y\u00f6netti\u011fi fabrikalarda imal edilmesini sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<a href=\"#_edn10\">[x]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD, bir yandan da, Uygur B\u00f6lgesi\u2019nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savunmu\u015f, Tayvan\u2019\u0131 anormal bi\u00e7imde silahland\u0131rmaya devam etmi\u015f, Tayvan Bo\u011faz\u0131\u2019nda Japonya ile ortak askeri tatbikatlar d\u00fczenlemi\u015f, insan haklar\u0131 konusunda \u00c7in\u2019i s\u00fcrekli bask\u0131 alt\u0131nda tutmu\u015f, hatt\u00e2 \u00c7in\u2019i \u201cm\u00fcstakbel serseri devlet\u201d kategorisine sokmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>B\u00fct\u00fcn bu ikili tutumlara ve par\u00e7alama siyasetine ra\u011fmen ABD, \u015eanghay \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc ve Karadeniz G\u00fcc\u00fc gibi uluslararas\u0131 ve b\u00f6lgesel ittifaklar\u0131; Rusya ile \u00c7in aras\u0131nda \u201cstratejik ortakl\u0131k\u201d anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e modern denizalt\u0131 ve sava\u015f u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 teknolojileri satmas\u0131n\u0131; gene Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Bu\u015fehr kentinde bir atom reakt\u00f6r\u00fc in\u015fa etmesini; \u00c7in\u2019in \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u015eahap serisi f\u00fczelerinin menzilini artt\u0131rma \u00e7abas\u0131na teknik destek vermesini; M\u0131s\u0131r, Suriye ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019\u00fcn Irak\u2019a muhtemel ABD sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131ktan kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmalar\u0131n\u0131 ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Irak s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131na askeri y\u0131\u011f\u0131nak yapmas\u0131n\u0131; gene Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Irak\u2019la 40 milyar dolarl\u0131k bir ticaret anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalamas\u0131n\u0131; hatt\u00e2 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin, kendi topraklar\u0131ndan kalkan ABD u\u00e7aklar\u0131 Irak\u2019\u0131 vurmaya devam ederken, bu \u00fclkeyle ikinci bir s\u0131n\u0131r kap\u0131s\u0131 a\u00e7ma m\u00fczakerelerinde bulunmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nleyememi\u015ftir. ABD, Britanya d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kendi m\u00fcttefiklerini de sava\u015f senaryolar\u0131na kazanamam\u0131\u015f; AB\u2019nin temel g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc olu\u015fturan Almanya\u2019n\u0131n \u0130ran ve Irak\u2019la ticari ili\u015fkilerini \u00f6nleyememi\u015ftir. ABD, AGSP (bir Avrupa ordusu kurma) giri\u015fimini istedi\u011fi gibi y\u00f6nlendirmeyi ba\u015faramam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Potansiyel m\u00fcttefiklerin niyet ve stratejileri farkl\u0131la\u015ft\u0131k\u00e7a ve sava\u015f ba\u015flatman\u0131n riski artt\u0131k\u00e7a ABD\u2019yi y\u00f6neten \u015fahinler ile g\u00fcvercinler aras\u0131ndaki anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar da artmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cDOLAYLI TUTUM\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>ABD\u2019nin, ku\u015fatma, d\u00fcnya uluslar\u0131n\u0131 siyaseten g\u00fc\u00e7s\u00fczle\u015ftirme ve silahs\u0131zland\u0131rma, \u201ck\u00fcreselle\u015fme\u201dnin bat\u0131 kapitalizmi formatlar\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnyaya yayma, b\u00fct\u00fcn \u00fclkeleri kendi \u201cimparatorlu\u011fu\u201d alt\u0131nda \u00e7okuluslu \u015firketlerin h\u00e2kim oldu\u011fu tek bir piyasa haline getirme, \u00e7e\u015fitli uluslar aras\u0131nda askeri ve iktisadi ittifaklar\u0131 \u00f6nleme ya da bu ittifaklar\u0131 y\u00f6nlendirme \u00e7abas\u0131, bu \u00e7abalar\u0131 durdurmak i\u00e7in yap\u0131lan ittifak ve giri\u015fimler de dikkate al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llarda b\u00f6lgesel sava\u015flar\u0131 \u015fiddetlendirecek ve yeni sava\u015flara yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Burada ABD\u2019nin \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgelere do\u011frudan askeri m\u00fcdahalesinden \u00e7ok, \u0130ngiliz strateji uzman\u0131 Sir Basil Liddell Hart\u2019\u0131n \u201cdolayl\u0131 tutum\u201d dedi\u011fi y\u00f6ntemi uygulayaca\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.<a href=\"#_edn11\">[xi]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bunun iki sebebi vard\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Birincisi, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n hi\u00e7 bir iktisadi ve demografik g\u00fcc\u00fc tek ba\u015f\u0131na Avrasya ve Ortado\u011fu gibi geni\u015f alanlar\u0131 fiilen askeri denetim alt\u0131na alamaz. Tek bir \u00fclkenin, bir ittifak sistemi i\u00e7inde olsa da b\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnyayla sava\u015fmas\u0131 ya da bu ama\u00e7la bir ittifak sistemi kurmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir. Ancak Immanuel Wallerstein, ABD \u015fahinlerinin ancak g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanarak (\u201c\u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7\u201d) d\u00fcnyadaki tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 Amerikan hegemonyas\u0131n\u0131 yeniden kurabileceklerine inand\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 belirtmektedir. Wallerstein\u2019a g\u00f6re, bu m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olabilir, ancak ABD\u2019nin 1945 ile 1965 aras\u0131nda sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fck, bu \u00fclkenin iktisadi konumunun Avrupa Birli\u011fi ya da Japonya\u2019n\u0131n fazla ilerisine ge\u00e7emedi\u011fi bir durumla yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmi\u015f bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bu nedenle ABD art\u0131k en yak\u0131n m\u00fcttefiklerinin g\u00f6z\u00fcnde bile tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131z bir siyasal sayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011fa sahip de\u011fildir. Geriye bir tek askeri \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yler Wallerstein ve bunun da, Machiavelli\u2019nin y\u00fczy\u0131llar \u00f6nce bize \u00f6\u011fretti\u011fi gibi, d\u00fcnya h\u00e2kimiyeti i\u00e7in yeterli olamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 vurgular.<a href=\"#_edn12\">[xii]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; \u0130kincisi, Eric Hobsbawm\u2019\u0131n deyi\u015fiyle, \u201cy\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 silahlar\u0131n demokratikle\u015fmesi\u201ddir.<a href=\"#_edn13\">[xiii]<\/a> Bu durum resmi olmayan \u015fiddeti denetim alt\u0131nda tutman\u0131n maliyetini katlan\u0131lamaz boyutlarda artt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 11 Eyl\u00fcl\u2019de \u0130kiz Kuleler\u2019e yap\u0131lan sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n, b\u00fcy\u00fck insan kayb\u0131na yol a\u00e7abilecek portatif n\u00fckleer silahlarla tekrarlanmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. Bu durum ABD\u2019yi \u201cdolayl\u0131 tutum\u201da daha \u00e7ok yakla\u015ft\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. \u015eiddet potansiyelini kendi \u00fczerine \u00e7ekmekten ka\u00e7\u0131nacak ve bu potansiyelin \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00fclkeler aras\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi i\u00e7in \u00e7al\u0131\u015farak, kritik anlarda m\u00fcdahale eden (tabii ki demokrasi, insan haklar\u0131, k\u00fcresel de\u011ferler vb. ad\u0131na) denetleyici bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olmay\u0131 ama\u00e7layacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cDolayl\u0131 tutum\u201d ABD\u2019nin riske girmesini, k\u0131ymetli askerlerinin \u00f6lmesini \u00f6nlemenin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, silah \u015firketlerinin \u015fimdiki ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc k\u00e2rlar\u0131n\u0131 artt\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131 da sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r. \u015eirket skandallar\u0131yla sars\u0131lan ve \u201cresesyon\u201da giren ABD ekonomisi, Ernest Mandel\u2019in deyi\u015fiyle, ancak a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 silahlanman\u0131n sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131 \u201cikame piyasas\u0131\u201dna dayanmak durumundad\u0131r. Ernest Mandel, \u201cSilahlanma politikas\u0131n\u0131n \u00fcretici kapasitede yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcme,\u201d demektedir, \u201c[kapitalizmin] kurtulmak istedi\u011fi \u00e7eli\u015fkileri daha da artt\u0131r\u0131r. Daha tehditk\u00e2r yeni bir safha yakla\u015f\u0131r. Birikmi\u015f silahlar\u0131n kullan\u0131m de\u011feri ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmedik\u00e7e, periferik, \u2018b\u00f6lgesel\u2019 ya da genel sava\u015flar patlak vermedik\u00e7e, silahlanma politikas\u0131 sonsuz bi\u00e7imde s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclemez. Ancak silahlar\u0131n \u2018t\u00fcketildi\u011fi,\u2019 ortadan kalkt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, yani sava\u015f patlak verdi\u011fi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, sarmal bir e\u011fri olu\u015fabilir. Nihayet teknik ilerleme birikmi\u015f silahlar\u0131 h\u0131zl\u0131 bir \u2018a\u015f\u0131nma\u201d ile tehdit eder. Sava\u015f haz\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve silahlanma birbirini sebep ve sonu\u00e7 olarak etkiledi\u011finden, silahlanman\u0131n belli bir noktas\u0131ndan itibaren b\u00fct\u00fcn fakt\u00f6rler sava\u015f tehlikesi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde bir bask\u0131 yarat\u0131r.\u201d <a href=\"#_edn14\">[xiv]<\/a> (Mandel bu sat\u0131rlar\u0131 1968 y\u0131l\u0131nda yazd\u0131. 34 y\u0131l sonra, \u00f6zellikle ABD silah teknolojisi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u201cbirikmi\u015f silahlar\u201d ve bunlar\u0131n \u201ca\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131\u201d diye bir kavram\u0131n olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ya da silah teknolojisindeki ilerlemelerin \u00e7evrimi \u00f6nemsenmeyecek kadar k\u0131saltt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hat\u0131rlamak gerekir. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7, \u201csava\u015f tehlikesi\u201dni hatt\u00e2 bizzat sava\u015flar\u0131 s\u00fcrekli hale getirecek \u015fekilde i\u015flemektedir.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ABD\u2019nin, <em>1997 Strategic Assessment<\/em> belgesinde d\u00fcnya devletlerini, \u201cserseri\u201d (rogue), \u201cm\u00fcstakbel serseri\u201d ve \u201cdi\u011ferleri\u201d \u015feklinde \u00fc\u00e7 kategoriye ay\u0131rmas\u0131, \u201cdolayl\u0131 stratejik tutum\u201du destekleyen bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve sunmaktad\u0131r. Burada \u201cserserili\u011fin\u201d \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcs\u00fc, s\u00f6z konusu devletlerin (a) N\u00fckleer-biyolojik-kimyasal silah \u00fcretme a\u015famas\u0131nda olmalar\u0131; (b) Ter\u00f6rizme destek vermeleri ya da g\u00f6z yummalar\u0131; (c) Bat\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 otoriter liderler taraf\u0131ndan y\u00f6netilmeleri; (d) ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgesel \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 tehdit etmeye haz\u0131r olmalar\u0131; (e) Kom\u015fular\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan tehdit olarak alg\u0131lanabilecek b\u00fcy\u00fck bir orduya sahip olmalar\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; \u0130ran, Irak, Libya, Kuzey Kore ve Suriye \u201cserseri devletler\u201d olarak; \u00c7in, M\u0131s\u0131r, Hindistan, Pakistan, G\u00fcney Kore, Tayvan ve T\u00fcrkiye ise \u201cm\u00fcstakbel serseri devletler\u201d olarak tan\u0131mlanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u0130kinci kategoride yer alan devletler; b\u00fcy\u00fck ordulara ve n\u00fckleer-biyolojik-kimyasal silah \u00fcretme kapasitesine sahiptirler; askeri a\u00e7\u0131dan kendine yeterli olmak i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7aba g\u00f6stermektedirler; liderlerinin veya siyasal ortamlar\u0131n\u0131n de\u011fi\u015fmesi halinde, ABD\u2019ye ters d\u00fc\u015fmeleri m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. <a href=\"#_edn15\">[xv]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Buradaki mant\u0131k, s\u00f6z konusu devletlerin, \u00fcretim kapasitelerinin daralt\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131, teknolojik bak\u0131mdan ilerlemelerinin engellenmesini, ordular\u0131n\u0131n sadece birbirine meydan okuyabilecek \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde zay\u0131flat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 ve bu \u00fclkelerin siyasal yap\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n s\u00fcrekli olarak d\u00fczenlenmesini gerektirmektedir. Kriz b\u00f6lgesi tan\u0131m\u0131, \u201cbu serseri devletler\u201din a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 silahlanmas\u0131 ya da birbiriyle sava\u015fmas\u0131 halinde olu\u015facak ko\u015fullar\u0131 anlatmaktad\u0131r. ABD ordusu b\u00f6yle bir krize \u201cson \u00e7are olarak\u201d m\u00fcdahale edecek ve ayn\u0131 anda iki cephede sava\u015facak \u015fekilde e\u011fitilmekte ve \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmektedir. Nitekim ABD askeri tarihinin en b\u00fcy\u00fck tatbikat\u0131 olan ve \u00fclkenin 26 ayr\u0131 b\u00f6lgesinde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen \u201cMillenium Challenge 2002\u201d tatbikat\u0131 iki ayr\u0131 komutanl\u0131k alt\u0131nda, biri \u00e7\u00f6l ko\u015fullar\u0131nda di\u011feri de geni\u015f bir su yolunun bulundu\u011fu bir b\u00f6lge \u00f6rnek al\u0131narak (iki komutanl\u0131k iki cephe) yap\u0131ld\u0131. \u00c7\u00f6l ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu\/Irak b\u00f6lgesini, geni\u015f su yolunun ise Asya-Pasifik b\u00f6lgesini \u00f6rnekledi\u011fi s\u00f6ylenebilir (TSK\u2019n\u0131n 96 saat olan seferberlik s\u00fcresinin tatbikatta i\u015fgal s\u00fcresi olarak belirtilmesi, \u0130stanbul Bo\u011faz\u0131\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6rneklendi\u011fine dair ku\u015fkulara yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ABD\u2019nin \u00f6zellikle Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesinde izledi\u011fi \u00e7izgi, Arap, T\u00fcrk ve K\u00fcrt ulus\u00e7ulu\u011funu; \u015eii, Vahabi, Musevi ve H\u0131ristiyan mezhep\u00e7ili\u011fini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmektedir. Bu par\u00e7alanmalar b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerinde i\u00e7 sava\u015f, devletler aras\u0131nda kurulan farkl\u0131 ittifak ve ili\u015fkiler ise uluslararas\u0131 sava\u015f potansiyelini artt\u0131rmakta; tarihsel ya da dinsel b\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131 birbirine kar\u015f\u0131 mevziye sokmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>SONU\u00c7<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; K\u00fcreselle\u015fmenin az geli\u015fmi\u015f d\u00fcnyada yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 iktisadi ve toplumsal y\u0131k\u0131m, ABD\u2019nin emperyalist bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak kendi varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in n\u00fckleer bir sava\u015f\u0131 g\u00f6ze almas\u0131yla birle\u015fmi\u015f ve k\u00fcresel d\u00fczeyde kampla\u015fmalara ve askeri bloklar\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyle birlikte formel varl\u0131k sebebi ortadan kalkan Kuzey Atlantik \u0130ttifak\u0131 (NATO) fiilen sadece ABD ile Britanya\u2019ya indirgenmi\u015f, ba\u015fta Almanya olmak \u00fczere AB \u00fclkeleri kendi askeri \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmelerini kurma \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrerek, Do\u011fu Akdeniz (K\u0131br\u0131s), Karadeniz (Bulgaristan, Romanya, Ukrayna), Ortado\u011fu (\u0130ran ve Irak) b\u00f6lgelerinde kendi hegemonik ili\u015fkilerini kurmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. \u00d6te yanda, Asya-Pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti, ABD-Japonya-Tayvan \u00fc\u00e7l\u00fcs\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 Rusya\u2019yla i\u015fbirli\u011fi yaparak kendi askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 geli\u015ftirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Rusya, Birle\u015fik Devletler Toplulu\u011fu\u2019nu ayakta tutmaya, Azerbaycan, G\u00fcrcistan, \u00c7e\u00e7enistan ve Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n entegrasyonunu sa\u011flamaya, \u0130ran ve Irak\u2019la ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirerek kadim Rus emperyal b\u00f6lgelerine ula\u015fmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ABD\u2019nin Irak\u2019a askeri m\u00fcdahalesi zamana yay\u0131lacak ve bu \u00fclkenin b\u00fct\u00fcn Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesinde \u0130srail\u2019in de yard\u0131m\u0131yla uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 dolayl\u0131 tutum stratejisi, uluslararas\u0131 askeri safla\u015fmalar\u0131 keskinle\u015ftirecek, etnik ve dinsel gruplar\u0131 daha da ayr\u0131\u015ft\u0131racak, b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131ndaki rekabet ve d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131klar\u0131 artt\u0131racak, mevcut dengeleri \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemez bi\u00e7imde bozacak ve harita de\u011fi\u015fikliklerine yol a\u00e7acakt\u0131r. <em>RED<\/em>, 26. 08. 2002<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\">[i]<\/a> Spencer Tucker, \u201cThe First World War\u201d, Jeremy Black (der.) <em>European Warfare, 1815-2000<\/em> i\u00e7inde, Palgrave, Londra 2002, s. 80.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\">[ii]<\/a> H. B. Liddel Hart, <em>Hitler\u2019in Generalleri Konu\u015fuyor<\/em>, \u00e7ev. Tanju Akad, Kasta\u015f Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 1996 \u0130stanbul, s. 91.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\">[iii]<\/a> S. P. Mackenzie, \u201cThe Second World War, 1939-45\u201d, Jeremy Black (der.), <em>European Warfare, 1815-2000<\/em> i\u00e7inde, Palgrave, Londra 2002, s. 131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\">[iv]<\/a> Regis Debray, \u201cBir Gezginden Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131\u2019na A\u00e7\u0131k Mektup\u201d, <em>Evrenin Efendileri<\/em> i\u00e7inde, \u00e7ev. Y. A. , Om Yay\u0131nevi, \u0130stanbul 2001, s. 431 vd.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\">[v]<\/a>Strategic Forecasting, <em>Afghanistan: Factions Challenging Government\u2019s Authority<\/em>, 22 Ocak 2002, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.stratfor.com\/\">http:\/\/www.stratfor.com<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\">[vi]<\/a> Ahmet Davuto\u011flu, <em>Stratejik Derinlik, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Uluslararas\u0131 Konumu<\/em>, K\u00fcre Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, \u0130stanbul 2002, s. 104.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\">[vii]<\/a> Ahmet Davuto\u011flu, agy, s. 105.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\">[viii]<\/a> Zbigniew Brzezinski, <em>Grand Chessboard<\/em>, Basic Books, New York 1997, s. 55<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\">[ix]<\/a> Bu konuda geni\u015f bir de\u011ferlendirme ve rakamlar i\u00e7in bk. Gilbert Achcar, \u201cStratejik \u00dc\u00e7l\u00fc: ABD, \u00c7in, Rusya,\u201d <em>Evrenin Efendileri<\/em> i\u00e7inde, \u00e7ev. Y.A., OM Yay\u0131nevi, \u0130stanbul 2001, s. 149 vd.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref10\">[x]<\/a> ABD\u2019nin \u00c7in\u2019le ekonomik ili\u015fkileri i\u00e7in bk. William Greider, <em>One World, The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism<\/em>, Simon &amp; Schuster, New York 1977, B\u00f6l\u00fcm 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref11\">[xi]<\/a> Bk., B. H. Liddell Hart, <em>Strateji, Dolayl\u0131 Tutum<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Em Korgeneral Cemal Erginsoy, T. C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Stratejik Et\u00fctler Dairesi Yay\u0131nlar, Ankara 1973.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref12\">[xii]<\/a> Immanuel Wallerstein,\u201d Iraq War: The Coming Disaster\u201d, 20 Nisan 2002, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.znet.com\/\">http:\/\/www.Znet.com<\/a> , Iraq Home<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref13\">[xiii]<\/a> Eric Hobsbawm, <em>K\u0131sa 20. Y\u00fczy\u0131l 1914-1991, A\u015f\u0131r\u0131l\u0131klar \u00c7a\u011f\u0131<\/em>, \u00c7ev. Y. A., Sarmal Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k, II. bs. \u0130stanbul 2002, s. 669.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref14\">[xiv]<\/a> Ernest Mandel, <em>Marksist Ekonomi El Kitab\u0131<\/em>, \u00e7ev. Orhan Suda, II. bs., Suda Yay\u0131nlar\u0131 , \u0130stanbul 1975, s. 134-135.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref15\">[xv]<\/a> Bu konuda bk. Michael Klare, <em>Rouge States and Nuclear Outlaws: America\u2019s Search for a New Foreign Policy<\/em>, Straus and Giroux, New York 1999; T\u00fcrk\u00e7esi: Michael Klare, <em>Serseri Devletler ve Yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 N\u00fckleer G\u00fc\u00e7ler<\/em>, Harp Akademileri \u00d6\u011fretim Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yay\u0131n\u0131, tarihsiz.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yavuz Alogan Sava\u015flar bir kez ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda kendi kurallar\u0131n\u0131 dayatarak geli\u015firler ve her evrede beklenmedik durumlar yaratarak \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemeyen sonu\u00e7lara yol a\u00e7arlar. Birinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan hemen \u00f6nce sava\u015f ekonomisine ve askeri teknolojiye ili\u015fkin \u00e7e\u015fitli teoriler geli\u015ftirildi. Bunlardan ikisi \u00f6zellikle an\u0131lmaya de\u011fer. Birine g\u00f6re, silahlar\u0131n y\u0131k\u0131m g\u00fcc\u00fc artt\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in sava\u015f k\u0131sa s\u00fcrecek ve taraflardan birinin silah teknolojisini etkin &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/?p=264\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;S\u0130LAHLARIN K\u00dcRESELLE\u015eMES\u0130&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-264","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/264","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=264"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/264\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":265,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/264\/revisions\/265"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=264"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=264"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/yavuzalogan.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=264"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}